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BURDENS OF PERSUASION:
BURDENED BY TOO MANY BURDENS
By Marvin B. Steinberg·

magine this scene: You have just delivered the best
closing argument in your trial career. The jury
deliberates for no longer than 20 minutes. The
foreperson announces a large verdict in favor of your
client; but, suddenly, before the foreperson can sit down,
the judge calls counsel to the bench: "I am disappointed
with the verdict this jury has returned Clearly, the weight
ofthe evidence was against the verdict ofthe jury. Viewing
all evidence and inferences in favor of the plaintiff, a
reasonable person could not return with a verdict in the
plaintiff's favor. Consequently, the verdict is vacated and
the case dismissed."
While this happens infrequently, it illustrates that success at a trial depends upon the moving party's ability to
meet its burden of persuasion to the satisfaction ofthe jury
and the judge. While no two trials are alike, all cases have
a specific degree of persuasion which must be satisfied.
Before becoming a judge, 1 never attempted to differentiate among the various degrees of persuasion. Instead, I
simply made out the best possible case for my client and
then argued that the result met the applicable burden. This
method of advocacy seemed to work best considering the
numerous types of persuasion burdens.
It was not until I became a judge and had to act as the
finder offact, that it became apparent that it was impossible
to distinguish among the various burdens with any degree
of assurance. Therefore, I thought it would be helpful to
collect the different burdens and place them in a relative
order of what I thought would be a neat, well organized,
precisely graduated list ofascending requirements ofeasily
determined degrees of persuasion. Much to my dismay,
however, the list turned into a quagmire of phrases without
solid underpinnings and defined boundaries, a paradigm in
form, but an undefined mass in substance.
Undaunted by my personal reaction and resulting doubt,
I ploughed ahead with the research (or at least pushed on
my law clerks). After much research, reading, and revision, I came across a law review article entitled: "Burdens
of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?"2 I heartily recommend it to all
judges and lawyers. While that treatise adequately ad-
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dressed my concerns, I felt that a brief article, confining
itselfto Maryland cases, would be of benefit to the bench
and bar. Dealing with the burdens of proofas a judge, I now
realize the importance, to trial lawyers, oftheir being able to
articulate the differences in their arguments to the judge as
well as the jury.
Burden ofproo/refers to that party who has the obligation of convincing the trier of fact ofthe truth ofthe facts as
alleged. The burden ofpersuasion, on the other hand, refers
to the various degrees of belief which a fact finder must
reach to deem facts to be true.) For example, in a criminal
case the burden of proof is on the government. The
government's burden of persuasion is to prove the necessary elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
The appropriate burden of persuasion is dictated by
either the substantive law of the case, or by the procedural
posture of the case. The latter occurs when the trial court
acts in an appellate capacity, such as when hearing exceptions from a Master's findings,S sitting in an en banc panel,6
or hearing appeals from a lower court' or administrative
agency. 8
This article will: (1) identify the various burdens of
persuasion used by Maryland's trial and appellate courts; (2)
illustrate the differences among those burdens; and, (3)
suggest a reduction in the number of different kinds of
burdens used so that the confusion among them is reduced.
I. TRIAL BURDENS DEFINED
At the trial level, there are three primary burdens of
persuasion: (1) preponderance ofthe evidence; (2) clear and
convincing evidence; and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt.
Substantive law dictates which burden is appropriate. Generally, the ''preponderance ofthe evidence" standard is used
in civil cases. The more stringent ''beyond a reasonable
doubf' standard is applied in criminal proceedings. A
middle ground of"clear and convincing evidence" is used in
a variety of cases as a result of common-law or statute. An
example ofthe former is a civil case where fraud is alleged.1I
An example ofthe latter is a case involving the involuntary
termination of parental rights. 10 In addition to these three
primary burdens, there are a number of other burdens the
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courts employ: probable cause to believe; reasonable
cause to believe; and reasonable suspicion, to name a few. 11
These burdens will be addressed later in this article. 12
Choosing the proper burden should be a mechanical
function; difficulties arise, however, in deciding if the
burden has been met. This problem occurs when judges
and juries fail to appreciate the distinctions between the
various burdens.
A. Preponderance ofthe evidence.
In addition to the traditional tort and contract cases,
there are other civil matters where the prepondeI3Dce
burden is appropriate. Among such cases are civil contempt proceedingsll and those equity matters such as
paternity,I4 divorce ls and proceedings seeking to sustain a
forfeiture of property. 16 PrepondeI3Dce of the evidence is
also applied in various "internal findings" in criminal cases
for juvenile waiver,11 admissibility of a defendant's confession or statements,I8 proof of affirmative defenses, and
evidence of mitigating factors in death penalty cases. 19
The prepondeI3Dce of
the evidence standard
requires evidence which:
(I) is sufficiently strong
to establish that a fact is
"more likely true than not
true"; or "more probable
than not"; (2) ''tips the
scale ever so lightly in
the favor of [the party
who bears the burden of
persuasion],,; (3) has the "greater weighf'; or (4) amounts
to at least 51 percent ofthe evidence. 2o The Mal)'land Civil
Pattern Jury instructions state:
[t]o prove by a preponderance of the evidence
means to prove that something is more likely so
than not so. In other words, a prepondeI3Dce of
the evidence means such evidence as, when considered and compared with that opposed to it, has
more convincing force and produces in your
minds a beliefthat it is more likely true than not
true. 2I
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Clear and convincing evidence is more than a prep ondeI3Dce of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt. 22 The Maryland Civil Pattern Jury
Instructions state: "[t]o be clear and convincing, evidence
should be 'clear' in the sense that it is certain, plain to the
understanding, and unambiguous and 'convincing' in the
sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you
to believe it.'>23
Clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate burden to apply, inter alia: in setting aside a release;24 establishing constructive trusts;2S the state's rebuttal to an
allegation that an informer'S identity is necesSaI)' and

relevant to a fair defense;26 using the sealed container
defense in product liability litigation;27 fraud;28 attorney
discipline actions before the attorney grievance commission;29 and involuntary civil commitment proceedings. 30
The most recently added forum for this burden is when
punitive damages are claimed in products liability cases,31
C. Beyond a reasonable doubt
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the appropriate
burden of persuasion in criminal cases,32 juvenile delinquency cases,33 and in determining the existence ofaggravating circumstances in death penalty cases. 34 InMontgomeryv. State,35 the Maryland Court ofAppeals reversed a trial
judge's jury instructions and described a proper instruction
for beyond a reasonable doubt:
That doesn't mean, however, that the State must
prove those elements of a crime to an absolute or
mathematical certainty. It means such evidence as
you would act upon in a matter involving important
affairs in your life or your business or with regard to
your property. If the
evidence is sufficient
that you would act
upon it in a very important matter in your
own lives then it is
sufficient to convict
in a criminal case. 36
In the case of Wills v.
State,37 the court of appeals made it very clear
that while no specific language is mandated, the preferred
instruction as to reasonable doubt should follow the Mal)'land Civil Pattern Jury Instructions.

"The appropriate burden ofpersuasion is dictated by either the substantive law ofthe case, or by the procedural posture of the case."
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II. APPELLATE BURDENS DEFINED

At the appellate level, there are primarily two standards
used to review the actions of a trial court, substantial
evidence and clearly erroneous. These appellate standards
are binding on a trial court when it is sitting as an appellate
court, such as when hearing an appeal from the district
court, hearing an administrative appeal, or hearing exceptions to the findings ofa master.38
A. Substantial Evidence
In all appeals, generally, and in administrative appeals
specifically, the reviewing court will not disturb the facts as
found by the initial fact finder if supported by substantial,
competent and material evidence when the record is viewed
as a whole. 39 Moreover, when dealing with an appeal from
an administrative agency, the court ofappeals requires that
the agency's decision be reviewed in the light most favorable to the agency, and that the court not infringe upon
judgments within the presumed expertise ofthe administrative agency.40 Clearly, this situation must be distinguished
from that presented by a de novo appeal. In such a case, the

"appellate court" acts as a fact finder and owes no deference
to the administrative agency. A de novo trial, in essence, is
a new trial.
In Newell v. Richards,41 the Court of Appeals of Maryland distinguished the appropriate difference in procedures
between appeals from the Health Claims Arbitration Office
for medical malpractice claims and those appeals from the
Workers' Compensation Commission. In an appeal from
the Health Claims Arbitration Office, the judge shall instruct the jury that while the decision ofan arbitration panel
is presumed to be correct, the plaintiff (Le., the claimant),
whether successful or not before the arbitration office still
has the burden ofproving his or her case by a preponderance
of the evidence. 42 "In workers' compensation cases, who.ever takes the appeal, whether claimant or employer/insurer, has the burden ofproving its case by a preponderance
of the evidence and becomes the "plaintiff' while the
appellee becomes the "defendant.'043 The two types of
appeals are treated differently because the medical malpractice appeal arises from a common law tort cause of action,
but workers' compensation cases are entirely creatures of
statute.44 In the Newell case, the court stated that while the
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions45 on the burden of
proof for medical malpractice is correct, it should be
preceded with a traditional instruction on plaintitrs burden
of proof upon request. 46
B. First-Level v. Second-Level Fact Finding
A Master makes "fll'St-level fact fmdings" which must
be accepted by the trial court if there was credible evidence
before the Master from which reasonable inferences could
be made supporting the Master's fmdings.47 For example,
if there is evidence of different amounts as to a party's
earnings, the Master's fmding of any specific amount,
supported by credible evidence, is binding on the trial court.
However, the conclusions and recommendations drawn
from these facts, i.e., second level facts, by the Master must
be determined by the trial court using its own discretion
without reliance on the Master's findings. 48 For example,
the specific amount of alimony recommended by a Master
would be a second level fact fmding. The trial judge reviews
that finding, using his or her own discretion which might,
but not necessarily, be the same conclusion as reached by
the Master.49
C. Clearly Erroneous
The clearly erroneous standard applies to review of a
Chancellor's factual findings. 50 While the rule can be
simply stated: an appellate court cannot set aside factual
fmdings unless they are clearly erroneous,51 the court of
special appeals has added a twist to that burden of persuasion in a recent case by creating a threshold test.
That test provides that the limits on the trial court's
discretion will ''he narrow" when consequences of a particular exercise of discretion are clear. For example, when
one result is clearly just and the other clearly unjust.

However, where there is no clear just or unjust result, the
trial court will have broad latitude in its use of discretion. 52
A threshold test must now be satisfied before an appellate
court can review and decide if a trial court's decision is
clearly erroneous. That question is: are the consequences
clearly, or unclearly, just or unjust? Presumably, there
would not be a dissenting opinion to an appellate answer to
this threshold question.
III. BURDEN APPLICATION PROBLEMS
In Harris v. State,53 the court stated that ''the choice of

a particular burden ofpersuasion is the way in which the law
sends the message to the fact finder that with respect to a
given issue, he should be persuaded a little bit, a lot, or
something in between.'tS4 As simple as this sounds, courts
are continually faced with the problem ofwhether the fact
finder has used the proper degree ofpersuasion. TheHarris
court continued with an explanation of the function of the
burden of persuasion in a case:
All the fact finder has acquired is a belief of what
probably happened The intensity of this belief the degree to which a fact finder is convinced that
a given act actually occurred - can, of course, vary
.... Although the phrases ''preponderance of the
evidence" and ''proof beyond a reasonable doubf'
are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate
to the finder of fact different notions concerning
the degree of confidence he is expected to have in
the correctness of his factual conclusions. 5s
A. Preponderance Of The Evidence.
There is a little difficulty in applying this burden which
is often defined as ''more likely than not." This is the burden
upon which most court decisions are based The difficulty
comes in applying those burdens which call for a lesser
degree of proof, such as "reasonably possible" and ''probable cause." Maryland courts have stated that "reasonably
satisfied" is no more stringent a standard than ''preponderance;"56 and that "[a] 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."S7
There seems to be little consistency among the various
lesser burdens used.
1. Reasonable Satisfaction
"Reasonable satisfaction" is the standard applicable in a
violation of probation proceeding. 58 This standard is actually the same as preponderance of the evidence. In Winkv.
State,S9 the court of appeals addressed the appellant's contention that the trial court applied the wrong standard of
proof in a revocation of probation hearing. 6O Appellant
claimed that the court used the ''preponderance of the
evidence" standard instead of the "reasonable certainty"
standard, which he believed was a higher degree ofproof. 61
The court, relying in part on case law from other jurisdictions, determined that "reasonable satisfaction" is actually
a preponderance of the evidence. 62 In addition, the court
23.2 I The Law For u m
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stated, ''tracking the origin and use of reasonable satisfaction in our cases demonstrates that the expression does not
connote a different standard from preponderance on a fact
fmding issue.'>63 Consequently, in violation of probation
proceedings, the state needs to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that a violation occurred in order to have a
defendant's probation revoked. 64
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence
. A number of problems have arisen in the proper application of this burden. & recently as 1986, the court of
appeals stated that the proper burden of persuasion to
establish fraud was "satisfactorily convincing evidence.'>6S
Two years later, a trial judge erroneously equated the clear
and convincing standard with proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 66 It is generally believed that the clear and convincing standard exists somewhere between a preponderance of
the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It
appears that clear and convincing can best be defined by
comparison - more than preponderance, but less than reasonable doubt.
C. Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Proof of guilt beyond all doubt has never been required
in Maryland, even in the most serious criminal cases. 67 In
Collins v. State,68 the defendant argued on appeal that the
trial court's jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt was
misleading and lowered the burden of proof. In its instruction, the court stated: "In other words, you must be reasonably certain ofthe guilt ofthe accused in order to convict. '>69
Defense counsel objected at trial to this phrase and the court
then reinstructed the jury that the burden to prove murder is
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals in affirmingthe trial court found that when the trial court reinstructed
as to the burden, it more than adequately explained the
beyond a reasonable doubt burden. 70
In Montgomery v. State,71 the court stated that "even
judges have problems construing the term reasonable doubt
and that laymen are at least as likely to misconstrue the
term.'>72 The court also stated that: ''the term reasonable
doubt' is not so commonplac~, simple and clear that its
meaning is self-evident to the jury."73
In Laster v. State,'4 the defendant objected to the trial
court's instruction on the reasonable doubt standard, saying
it "could only . . . confuse and mislead the jury . . ." The
trial court instructed, in part, as follows:
Now, when we say beyond a reasonable doubt, are
we telling you that the State has to prove it more
than a reasonable doubt or beyond a reasonable
doubt or further than a reasonable doubt? That's
ridiculous. & I said, it's a term ofart and what it
means is that the State has to prove its case to the
exclusion ofa reasonable doubt. Now, let me tell
you what a reasonable doubt is not. It doesn't mean
that you have to be a hundred percent convinced of
the Defendant's guilt . . . A reasonable doubt is
6 The Law For u m 123_2

just what it says, it's a doubt founded on reason.
When you go back in the jury room you take your
common sense with you. 7S
The court of special appeals noted that ''there is no particular litany a court must recite in defining reasonable doubt
. . . in any event, we perceive no error.'''6
One can see in the Laster jury instruction the results of
an attempt by the court to define the beyond a reasonable
doubt burden in lay terms. It also demonstrates how this and
other burdens are terms ofart which are likely to be applied
differently by different people.
IV. JUDICIAL SURVEY
As I researched this article, I became curious about my

colleagues' concepts ofthe burdens of persuasion. I asked
them to complete a survey modelled on that used by
Professor McCauliffin her research. 77 The survey asked the
judges to give a percentage value to each of nine phrases
which describe various burdens faced by them. Space was
provided for any written comments. 78 Of the twenty-five
judges on the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, fourteen
judges responded to the survey. Of the fourteen who
completed and returned the survey, eleven placed numerical
values by each of the burdens, while the remaining three
explained why they could not evaluate the burdens in
percentages. One ofthe three simply stated: "I am unable
to place numerical percentages by these concepts." The
other two stated that they could not quantify the burdens
and rnnked them in descending order from highest to lowest
degree of certainty required.
There was significant variety among the responses to the
survey.79 As to the percentage value of ' 'preponderance of
the evidence," responses were: 50-plus percent, 50.1 percent, and 51 percent. Nine respondents agreed that preponderance of the evidence was valued at just higher than 50
percent. 80 Responses to "clear and convincing evidence"
ranged from 60 percent to 85 percent, with the majority
placing this burden at 75 percent. 81 The responses to
''beyond a reasonable doubt" ranged from 65 percent to 100
percent, with no more than two respondents agreeing on the
value for this burden.82 The response to "clearly erroneous"
was the largest spread, from a low of 0-0.1 percent to
a high of90-plus percent. 83
Of particular interest was the comparison of the response of 65 percent certainty for beyond a reasonable
doubt with the response of 85 percent needed for clear and
convincing.
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTION
The rationale for requiring different degrees of persuasion is traced to what degree society will tolerate the
possibility of error. No more than a probability is required
in a tort case, but substantially more probability is required
when one's liberty or life is at stake. Society is more willing

to tolerate innocent people bearing the cost ofan automobile
accident (if 51 percent probability is satisfactory, that
means that a 49 percent possibility of error is acceptable)
than it is to tolerate incarcerating innocent persons.
For the fact finder, there oughtto be only two burdens of
proof, preponderance ofthe evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. As evidenced by cases and judicial surveys, the
clear and convincing standard is a happy medium that is
neither happy nor medium.
For appeals, there should be only a/actually based test;
that of substantial evidence. The clearly erroneous rule is
an awkward phrase. A conclusion is either erroneous or not.
The modifier, "clearly" does nothing to this test but add a
level of confusion. This is shown by the survey responses,
ranging from less than one to more than ninety percent.
In summary, the use of various burdens of persuasion
ought to be streamlined. Justice requires consistency which
can best be obtained by reducing the varieties of burdens of
proof and making their definitions clear. (Not clear and
convincing, nor clear beyond a reasonable doubt, just
clear!) As to the lesser burdens, such as reasonable probability, etc., they are so hopelessly impossible to describe
with any degree of precision, that they can only be understood by reference to fact specific precedent.
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